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ABSTRACT  
The present Work Project (WP) is the result of Sonae’s concern with fraud risk, seeking to 
implement a method that formally describes and evaluates it in its various forms. In a context of 
limited human, capital, time and tools’ resources, the Internal Audit (IA) department of the 
company developed a framework to raise the awareness of top management and identify which 
processes of its value chain present a higher level of exposure to fraud, with the purpose of 
redirecting attention to those and prioritizing the creation of new mechanisms to monitor its KPIs’ 
dynamics. 
Keywords: Fraud Risk Assessment; Internal Audit; Fraud Risk; Continuous Audit. 
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I. PURPOSE OF THE WORK PROJECT 
The current work project (WP) is the result of a directed research internship at Sonae’s IA 
department. The purpose of the internship, as part of the “Call for Solutions” program, was to 
complete and operationalize a project: developing a fraud assessment (FA) methodology that 
retrieves the fraud risk of processes, which shall be incorporated in the IA department’s analysis of 
the map of processes. With the methodology finished, an assessment will be conducted in two 
departments involved in the “Selecção, Contratação e Manutenção de Fornecedores” process of 
the company: “Direcção Comercial de Casa e Têxtil (DCCT)” and “Direcção Comercial de Bazar 
(DCB)”, from the good’s retail division of Sonae (Sonae MC). 
Context of the WP 
On a recent past, developed economies have been through a period of rapid change. Globalization, 
financial crisis, increasing complexity of business models and practices (namely, the introduction of 
complex IT infrastructures), political instability along with other dynamic factors, are issues that 
companies and employees have had to cope with. The need to deliver results, in this period of great 
volatility, has consequently led to a higher risk of workers behaving unethically (EY, 2015). In 
other words, the propensity of employees to act fraudulently has significantly increased (KMPG, 
2014; Kroll, 2013) and fraud-related events, like Enron, in 2001, or Volkswagen, in 2015, have 
become common, thus jeopardizing the integrity of companies’ reports (Riley & Rezaee, 2009), the 
public trust in corporations and, consequently, their market valuation (Vasiu, L., Warren, M. & 
Mackay, D, 2003).  
Even though “fraud does not draw community and political reaction like other crimes” (Chapman & 
Smith, 2001, pp. 971), the increasing governmental and corporate efforts to create a globally stricter 
context against fraud (proved by the emergence of more influential laws, articles and books related 
to the topic than ever before) conveys the topic’s relevance (KPMG, 2013; Power, 2013).  
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Numbers show that fraud is a global issue and it is becoming more dramatic (Farrel & Healy, 2000). 
In fact, occupational fraud costs, on average, 5% of yearly revenues (ACFE, 2014). Data about 
losses strictly due to internal frauds in Portugal is unknown. Yet, if losses in retail due to theft 
totalize 300 million per year in this country (Ferreira, 2015), one can have an idea of the 
phenomenon’s dimension. 
Following COSO’s Principle 8, “The organization considers the potential for fraud in assessing 
risks to the achievement of objectives”. Gradually, companies’ corporate governance evolution 
determined a shift from the red flag analysis to fraud risk management, which entails prevention, 
detection and response (Power, 2013), starting with corporate culture enhancements and structured 
response policies to legitimately deal with present incidents and promote internal resistance to 
future ones (Iyer & Samociuk, 1992). It was at this point that Sonae decided to develop a method to 
evaluate fraud risk of its processes to highlight those more prone and help in the IA department 
deployment of resources.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To approach fraud risk, understanding the concepts related to it is imperative. Hence, this section 
will present the most accepted theories that describe the phenomenon. 
Definition of Fraud 
Although fraud is a common concept, defining it is not simple, due to the variety of schemes, forms, 
places and the cultural environment where it can occur (Kirk & Woodcock, 1992). Still, to develop 
a proper fraud prevention strategy, a company must be able to precisely define and understand the 
impact of fraud. Otherwise, any plan developed will miss its main objectives (Vasiu, L., Warren, M. 
& Mackay, D., 2003).  
A characteristic of fraud is that it presupposes intent. Also, it can be classified as internal (unethical 
actions taken within the organization, either by employees or managers) or external (unethical acts 
carried out by individuals outside the organization). Having these premises in mind, many 
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definitions have been so far created. For instance, Rossow (2000) clarifies the difference between 
corruption and fraud, and defines fraud as an “intentional deception by concealing or 
misrepresenting information that harms the financial interest of another person(s) and benefits the 
financial interests of the perpetrator” (pp. 887). Wells (2007), has defined fraud as a broad concept 
that includes any crime which, through deception, has the intention of profiting. According to the 
Institute of Internal Auditors’ (IIA) standards of internal auditing (2008), fraud is a vast concept 
which encompasses “any illegal acts characterized by deceit, concealment or violation of trust” to 
obtain any kind of advantage. 
Contrarily to the definitions above, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) considers 
the occupational part of fraud in the Fraud Tree it designed, neglecting the organizational kind (see 
definitions in appendix I). Effectively, the tree divides fraud schemes in three different 
categories/groups: Financial Statement Fraud, Asset Misappropriation, and Corruption (appendix 
II). Within these categories, more specific fraud schemes are presented. 
Particularly, the Corruption category includes fraud schemes such as: Conflicts of interest, Bribery, 
Illegal Gratuities and Economic Extortion. Regarding Asset Misappropriation, it includes Theft of 
Cash in hand and receipts, Fraudulent Disbursements and Inventory and other Assets 
misappropriation. Lastly, respecting Financial Statement Fraud, Asset/Revenues overstatements and 
understatements constitute the list of the most relevant fraud schemes. 
Determinants of Fraud 
In general, after defining what fraud represents for the company, an efficient management of fraud 
risk requires the previous identification of internal weaknesses, proactivity towards the possibility 
of fraud and detection of the drivers that may lead to fraudulent actions, in order to allow the design 
of internal prevention response policies accordingly (Smith, 2001). In fact, if not 
counterproductively created, fraud prevention and control initiatives are the best option to avoid the 
negative effects of such phenomenon (Wells, 2002). 
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In the analysis of fraud drivers, the model of Fraud Triangle (appendix III), created by Cressey in 
1953, is the basis of numerous fraud detecting methodologies (Lou & Wang, 2009). Cressey 
identified three necessary conditions for the occurrence of fraud/trust violation: need, opportunity 
and rationalization/justification (Lero & Geis, 2010).  
“Need” regards pressures arising from financial familiar issues, company stakeholders’ 
expectations, or even political and social pressures that may generate the urge to behave in 
unethically. Knowing that crimes follow “Opportunity” (Grabosky, Smith & Dempsey, 2001), this 
vertex poses a major fraud threat for companies, especially when internal controls are not correctly 
implemented or do not cover all the relevant actions, resulting in ineffective discouragement of 
unethical behaviors (Murdock, 2008). The last fraud driver is the individual’s capacity to find a 
“Justification” to the unethical action that fraudsters finds admissible, enabling them not to feel 
regret (Cullen & Wilcox, 2010). The most common justifications emerge from frustrations in the 
workplace, such as failed promotions or reduction of benefits, which are normally related to poor 
human resources management (Murdock, 2008). 
According to Boyle, DeZoort and Hermanson (2015), the “fraud model type significantly affects 
auditors’ fraud risk judgments” (pp. 593) so contextual adaptations are necessary. Thus, despite the 
Triangle’s high degree of applicability, throughout the years, changes have been proposed to mend 
its limitations (Kassem & Higson, 2012) and adapt it to today’s context. One of the most important 
updates of the model was proposed by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004), who considered the need to 
add an extra element to describe fraud motivations. Their model was known as the Fraud Diamond 
model, as it added an element to the triangle: the fraudster’s capability. The authors considered that 
many frauds only occurred because the person committing it had certain skills to identify, 
understand and exploit internal weaknesses (Boyle, DeZoort & Hermanson, 2015). Furthermore, 
Murdock (2008) argued that auditors assessing fraud risk should consider people’s character and the 
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determinants of their attitude. Specifically, he categorized them as honest, situational/potential or 
dishonest, depending on moral principles, and allocated a certain degree of risk to each category. 
Normative References on Risk Management 
After getting to the root causes of fraud and framing it as a crucial matter of Corporate Governance, 
it becomes clear that the implementation of a program that manages risk is crucial to thrive 
nowadays. The most usually applied measures in today’s businesses, such as anonymous reporting 
channels and codes of conduct, fall short when reducing losses is concerned (Lister, 2007), 
implying that new measures must be enforced. 
In 2009, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International 
Eletrotechnical Commission (IEC) conceived a risk management framework (appendix IV) which, 
despite not being specifically designed for fraud risk, can be used to study this phenomenon. The 
framework’s approach involves a process of risk management composed by five main steps: the 
context of the analysis, the risk assessment (which is the main purpose of the WP and includes the 
identification, analysis and evaluation of risk), the risk treatment and the constant communication 
and monitoring of risk throughout the process. Even though there are international standards, fraud 
risk management practices might vary amongst firms on timings, whether the fraud assessment is 
integrated with other risk assessment practices and the methods to evaluate risk (Shelton, 
Whittington & Landsittel, 2001). Studies suggest, that, even with similar mechanisms to prevent 
and detect fraud, outcomes would be different, due to the specific characteristics of organizations, 
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Risk Context and Assessment Preparation 
The context of an analysis is always important, as it concerns the preparation and study of the 
organization involved. The outcome of this step is a risk management strategy, incorporating the 
decision of scope, sources of risk, resources needed, assumptions and constraints, the methodology 
(NIST SP800-30, 2012) and the risk tolerance to fraud schemes (PwC, 2008). 
Risk Assessment 
With a defined strategy, the second step of the risk management process is the effective assessment 
of risk. By this step, the auditor is expected to identify risks, analyze and evaluate them (NIST 
SP800-30, 2012). 
Firstly, the identification of a risk comprehends defining the fraud schemes to consider in the 
assessment (depending on the type of organization, activity sector, among other factors) (ACFE, 
2008), how they affect the organization, as well as when and where they may occur (ISO 
31000:2009).  
Secondly, the risk analysis is constituted by the listing of controls for each sub process and an 
estimation of the likelihood and impact of fraud schemes, while aware of the uncertainty this sort of 
analysis encompasses. The estimate is achieved through suitable risk assessment techniques, 
selected considering the organization, the available resources, the complexity of business, the 
degree of uncertainty and the business life cycle phase when the assessment is made (ISO/IEC 
31010:2009). Combining likelihood and impact, an estimate of risk level will be obtained. 
Lastly, an evaluation of the risk levels must be obtained from auditors, who are expected to explain 
values and compare them to tolerance thresholds previously established. 
Risk Treatment 
Considering the conclusions of the assessment step, it is fundamental that risk treatment measures 
are implemented where results require action, with the goal of reducing both likelihood and 
consequences of risk both in the short and long-term (ISO 31000:2009). 
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Communication and Consultation 
Throughout the whole process, information and communication flows are necessary to ensure the 
involvement of those being assessed and to guarantee the assessment is still in line with the context 
of the organization (ISO 31010, 2009). Notice that, contrarily to other messages, communicating 
risks implies a higher degree of care since a misunderstanding of the message conveyed can 
undermine the evaluation and the trust between coworkers (Rowan, 1994). 
Monitoring and Review 
To maintain the information valid and valuable, organizations must review fraud risk estimates as 
frequently as possible. 
III. METHODOLOGY FOLLOWED IN THIS WP 
This WP consisted of a directed research internship for the IA department of Sonae, where the 
research matter was about the assessment of fraud in the company’s process of “Selecção, 
Contratação e Manutenção de Fornecedores”. The project’s method was designed as a case study 
research with the goal of exploring “what is happening; to seek new insights; to ask questions and 
to assess phenomena in a new light” (Robson, 2002, p. 59). 
Following a building-theory procedure, the research’s population was previously defined by the IA 
department, specifically due to internal motives related to the department’s degree of coverage. 
Thus, the commercial department of “Casa e Têxtil” and “Bazar” was the object chosen to perform 
a fraud evaluation. 
To achieve the intended goal, the project comprehended using multiple data collection tools, 
contributing for a stronger basis of the project and taking advantage of existing synergies between 
them (Eisenhardt, 1989). The study of internal documentation and meetings with experienced 
internal auditors provided, in the beginning, an understanding of the process’s operations. 
Hereafter, the analysis of theme-related literature allowed the decision of the method used to gather 
data, compile it and provide insights about fraud exposure of the company. Taking into 
 
10 |  P a g e
 
consideration the complexity of the phenomenon being studied, the organization’s resources and the 
kind of information needed, the most suitable primary source of quantitative and qualitative 
information was a questionnaire, carried out through in-person interviews and e-mail (appendix V). 
Additionally, a semi-structured in-person interview (appendix VI) was designed and conducted with 
the internal auditor that performed the last process audit in the chosen departments, in order to list 
the process’s internal controls and the related findings (non-conformities). 
After obtaining the needed raw information, its treatment was conceived in an excel model 
containing quantitative and qualitative factors considered relevant to characterize each fraud 
scheme. This model is a matrix (FA Matrix) adapted from a matrix developed by the ACFE, the IIA 
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (2008), containing additional 









































































































































































































































      Figure 1- Factors considered in the Fraud Assessment Matrix 
      Source: Author   
The following step was analyzing the matrix’s results and shaping hypotheses that may explain 
them, while confronting it with literature, in order to complement the understanding of facts and 
reach final conclusions to guide future work. 
 























To summarize, the methodology followed in the WP to assess the fraud risk of “Selecção, 




“Selecção, Contratação e Manutenção de Fornecedores” process at Sonae 
Generally speaking, Sonae’s operations are organized in groups of processes, which are constituted 
by processes that are composed by a set of sub processes, covering all the possible activities carried 
out by Sonae. These processes are performed by many departments/divisions, for all the brands of 
Sonae’s divisions (Sonae MC and Sonae SR). 
In this WP, the focus will be on the abovementioned process, from the perspective of the 
departments “Direcção Comercial de Casa e Têxtil (DCCT)” and “Direcção Comercial de Bazar 
(DCB)”. As presented in Figure 3, the process is composed by five activities, involving all the tasks 
performed in the relationship with suppliers. Firstly, a procurement of possible suppliers for the 
needed goods is done. Secondly, after having a proposal from the suppliers, they are compared, 
based on defined criterion. Once a proposal is understood as the best, Sonae’s commercial 
department negotiates and signs a general supplying contract, taking responsibility for the 
relationship management as well as the examination of supplier’s performance and possible 
        Figure 2 - Methodology followed to assess Fraud Risk at Sonae   
        Source: Author 
 












renewal. During this process, not only do commercial directors have an important role, but also area 




THE WP TOOLS  
To carry out the WP, a matrix (used to compile quantitative inputs) and the information-gathering 
tools (questionnaire and interview) were developed to be automatic and include proposals from 
guides, international standards and organization-specific requirements. 
The developed FA Matrix 
This tool contains thirteen qualitative and quantitative nonfinancial factors (revisit Figure 1) in its 
columns, used to describe fraud schemes. These factors’ choice was a critical matter since the 
nonfinancial measures are expected to complement the loopholes of an external/financial audit 
(Brazel, Jones & Zimbelman, 2009).   
The first three factors are the identification of the fraud scheme, which sub process is being 
analyzed and a description of the scheme’s functioning on it (NIST SP800-30, 2012; ACFE, IIA 
and AICPA, 2008). Then, an identification of the department being assessed is provided. The 
following three factors are quantitative: average likelihood of fraud scheme’s occurrence and 
average impact of fraud schemes (each one varying from one to five), which multiplied will provide 
       Figure 3 - Subprocesses of the process "Selecção, Contratação e Manutenção de Fornecedores" 
       Source: Author 
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a level of fraud risk (that ranges from one to twenty-five) (NIST SP800-30, 2012; ISO/IEC 31010, 
2009; ACFE, IIA and AICPA, 2008; IA department’s discussion). 
(1) (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡) 
Furthermore, four other quantitative and qualitative factors associated to controls are presented: 
firstly, the date of the last process audit; secondly, the average percentage efficiency of internal 
controls in the fight of a fraud scheme perceived by collaborators
1
 (i.e. % efficiency perceived); 
thirdly, a similar factor, yet the percentage of efficiency of the control is defined according to the 
number of non-conformities found in the last process audit (i.e. % effective efficiency) – it is 
calculated through the application of a formula that assigns points to each control, depending on the 
number of findings and their criticality (see criteria in appendix VII); lastly, the percentage of 
controls’ effectiveness in the mitigation of fraud events, which derives from the average of the 
efficiency perceived by the effective efficiency (NIST SP800-30, 2012; ACFE, IIA and AICPA, 
2008). 
(2) (% 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠′𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = (% 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 + % 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦)/2) 
After the Controls’ evaluation, the matrix features a factor that weighs the existence of continuous 
auditing of an item in the process, which shall reduce the risk of fraud if it is monitored, as these 
items are constantly evaluated and compared to thresholds defined. This factor was considered 
relevant to take into consideration since the IA department contains an IT tool that is specifically 
designed to perform this kind of analysis and detect outlying values (the red flags for fraudulent 
actions). 
Finally, the last factor is the expression of the real risk of fraud schemes, which consists of a one-to-
twenty-five factor. It considers the level of fraud risk balanced by the % controls’ effectiveness and 
                                                          
1
 Controls were not designed specifically for fraud schemes but were associated to them for this assessment 
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the existence of continuous monitoring in the process, defining the colors according to the value 
obtained (criteria in appendix VIII) (ISO/IEC 31010, 2009; IA department’s discussion): 
(3) 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =
= ( 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 − ( 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ∗ % 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠′𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠))
∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2) 
The lines of the FA Matrix will feature a Sonae-tailored version of ACFE’s fraud schemes (cf. 
Figure 4), focusing on the occupational and organizational schemes that can be initiated in Sonae’s 
business sector.  
Data Collection Tools  
As referred previously, two different questionnaires were the selected techniques to obtain data: one 
for the commercial department’s collaborators involved in the process; another for the last process 
auditor.  
The Commercial Departments’ Questionnaire 
Effectively, the template of the questionnaire, used for in-person interviews and e-mail 
questionnaires with the commercial department’s collaborators, consisted of a four-part document, 
in this order: “Possible Fraud Schemes”; “Likelihood of occurrence and Impact”; “Procedures and 
                                                          
2
 The value of this ponderation was defined internally 
       Figure 4 - Fraud schemes analyzed in the assessment 
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Internal Controls”; and general questions. This questionnaire was developed and tested within the 
IA department, in the first place, and upon approval it was put to practice. 
The first part consisted of a yes-or-no question, to define which of the fourteen fraud schemes were 
actually relevant for the fraud risk analysis of the “Selecção, Contratação e Manutenção de 
Fornecedores” process at Sonae. The second part contained a set of three questions, in which the 
first questions regarded the existence of previous fraud assessments and the remaining part required 
the classification (from one to five) of the likelihood of occurrence and impact of fraud schemes 
identified as possible in the previous question, for each of the sub processes. Thirdly, questions 
about awareness and application of procedures, as well as internal controls’ fraud mitigation 
effectiveness were asked. Lastly, collaborators were consulted about specific fraud-training, the 
existing reporting channel and suggestions to fight fraud.  
The scope of respondents to this questionnaire consisted of first-line employees (Commercial 
Directors (DC), Area Leaders (DUN) and Commercial Managers (GC), according to appendix IX) 
connected to the process in the chosen departments, as defined in a meeting with the IA 
department’s senior staff. Consequently, while DCs and DUNs were personally interviewed, due to 
the expectation of a higher level of technical know-how, deriving from higher experience and a 
broader perspective of the process, the departments’ GCs were asked to fill the same questionnaire 
via e-mail. The chosen width is justified by the fact that fraud assessments must take into account a 
wider range of information than, for instance, financial audits, where only a sample of the scope is 
checked (Albrecht & Hoopes, 2014). 
The Internal Auditors’ Questionnaire 
Parallel to this questionnaire, a semi-structured short questionnaire (see appendix VI) was 
developed to collect data about the last “Selecção, Contratação e Manutenção de Fornecedores” 
audit. In general, this interview aimed at discovering: specificities of the departments being 
assessed; which internal controls were identified in the process; how many findings were reported 
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in the audit; a linkage between the existing internal controls and the fraud schemes; and a formula 
to calculate the percentage effectiveness of controls in discouraging fraud. The results of the 
interview were translated in an excel worksheet containing the criteria to determine controls’ 
effectiveness, which is directly linked to the excel model of the FA Matrix (see appendix VII). 
 
IV. FRAUD ASSESSMENT FINDINGS 
In this chapter, the information gathered through the 24 valid answers (out of 31 defined DCs, DUNs and 
GCs) will be compiled and analyzed. Effectively, the average and coefficient of variation were used as 
measures of central tendency and dispersion, and they were calculated for each numerical question. Having 
these values, the FA Matrix was filled and, consequently, retrieved the fraud risk along the process being 
studied. The output produced in this WP is compiled in the FA Matrix (appendix X). 
In terms of coefficient of variation, for values below 15% (0,15), dispersion was considered low; for values 
between 15% (0,15) and 30% (0,30), dispersion was considered medium; above 30% (0,30), dispersion was 
seen as high (Pestana and Gageiro, 2008).  
Likelihood and Impact of possible Fraud schemes 
In the questionnaire used to inquire the DCB and DCC&T, the first question intended to discover 
which of the initially identified fraud schemes were actually considered relevant for the analysis, 
according to the opinion of those involved in the process
3
. 
                                                          
3 if the number of respondents answering “Sim” was higher or equal to 25%, the IA Department of Sonae defined the 
fraud scheme should be included in the analysis. 
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Table 1- Possible Fraud Schemes 
 
        Source: Question 1, from the questionnaire in Appendix V 
 
In Table 1, one can identify which fraud schemes were deemed as possible to occur in the process 
of “Selecção, Contratação e Manutenção de Fornecedores”, according to respondents’ experience. 
Specifically, “Conflicts of Interest”, “Bribery” and “Illegal Gratuities” were the most consensual 
answers, while “Misuse of Assets”, “Timing Differences” and “Understatement of Assets/Revenues 
/Liabilities/Expenses” were only considered possible by around 20% of collaborators, determining 
their exclusion of the subsequent analysis. 
After defining the fraud schemes to be analyzed in this assessment, the questionnaire asked for the 
perceived of the Likelihood of occurrence and the Impact if successfully carried out in each of the 
five sub processes of “Selecção, Contratação e Manutenção de Fornecedores”. For informative 
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      Source: Question 2.2, from the questionnaire in Appendix V 
      Legend: Average | Coefficient of variation 
 
Starting with the Likelihood of Occurrence (Table 2), it is noticeable that, in general, the considered 
schemes were actually seen as possible to occur throughout all the sub processes and their average 
values of likelihood, between different sub processes, is very similar.  
In terms of fraud schemes, the one that presents the highest probability of occurring is “Illegal 
Gratuities”, with values ranging between 3,59 and 3,83, followed by “Bribery”. On the opposite 
situation, “Economic Extortion” and “Equity Value Damage” are the schemes presenting the lowest 
likeliness of happening within the analyzed process, with average values below 2. 
Concerning sub processes, the highest average fraud risk is obtained in the “Evaluation and 































L L L L L L L L L L L
2,39 3,21 3,71 1,11 2,00 2,00 2,38 2,75 2,00 3,30 1,83
0,36 0,37 0,16 0,59 0,39 0,31 0,14 0,34 0,87 0,54 0,63
2,89 3,40 3,83 1,33 2,17 2,00 2,22 3,00 2,00 3,18 1,88
0,28 0,32 0,13 0,52 0,29 0,30 0,32 0,36 0,80 0,51 0,62
2,68 3,40 3,78 1,33 2,17 2,00 2,22 3,00 2,00 3,18 1,88
0,28 0,32 0,13 0,52 0,29 0,29 0,32 0,36 0,80 0,51 0,62
2,56 3,07 3,59 1,38 2,17 2,00 2,22 2,63 2,00 3,18 1,88
0,31 0,37 0,13 0,48 0,44 0,37 0,23 0,32 0,80 0,51 0,53
2,61 3,14 3,76 1,50 2,17 2,00 2,22 2,89 2,00 3,18 1,88
0,30 0,36 0,20 0,64 0,36 0,31 0,34 0,39 0,80 0,51 0,53




















Table 2 - Average Likelihood of Occurrence of Fraud Schemes, in different Sub processes 
 































I I I I I I I I I I I
2,72 3,64 3,65 1,89 1,80 1,00 1,75 2,88 4,13 3,50 2,67
0,31 0,32 0,16 0,34 0,43 0,61 0,19 0,32 0,42 0,51 0,43
2,95 3,80 3,67 2,22 1,67 1,00 1,89 3,22 4,13 3,55 3,13
0,27 0,28 0,14 0,31 0,38 0,61 0,37 0,34 0,39 0,46 0,37
2,95 3,80 3,72 2,22 1,67 1,00 1,89 3,22 4,13 3,55 3,13
0,25 0,28 0,14 0,31 0,38 0,59 0,37 0,34 0,39 0,46 0,37
2,67 3,57 3,53 1,88 1,67 1,40 1,89 2,38 4,13 3,55 3,13
0,29 0,32 0,13 0,35 0,57 0,52 0,27 0,35 0,39 0,46 0,32
2,67 3,50 3,65 2,13 1,67 1,40 1,89 3,00 4,13 3,55 3,13
0,29 0,33 0,21 0,46 0,46 0,44 0,40 0,38 0,39 0,46 0,32





















      Legend: Average | Coefficient of variation (below) 
      Source: Question 2.2, from the questionnaire in Appendix V 
The analysis of Impact (Table 3), as perceived by those involved in “Selecção, Contratação e 
Manutenção de Fornecedores”, demonstrates that the highest effect in the results of Sonae would 
occur in case the “False Documents/Transactions” scheme was successfully deployed, with an 
average expected impact of 4,13 along the whole process. Moreover, the occurrence of deliberate 
“Liabilities’ Increase (through price collusion with suppliers)”, “Illegal Gratuities”, “Bribery” or the 
Damage of the company’s Equity (namely, Brand Image) are understood to be serious. 
Considering the Impact of schemes per sub process, a fraudulent event during the “Negotiation” and 
“Evaluation and Selection of Suppliers” phases are expected to have residually higher repercussions 
in the company’s objectives, followed by the “Supplier’s Management and Revision”.  
In both factors (Likelihood of occurrence and Impact), the level of dispersion revealed by the 
coefficient of variation (a division of the standard deviation by the average) is considered high, 
which means the responses obtained were not very homogeneous and dependent on the 
sensitivity/perception and experience of the collaborators’. 
Table 3 - Average Impact of Fraud Schemes, in different Sub processes 
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As explained in section 4, the factor “Level of Fraud Risk” is composed by the multiplication of the 
abovementioned factors: Likelihood of Occurrence and Impact. 
      Legend: Green: 1-6,25; Yellow: 6,25-12,5; Orange: 12,5-18,75; Red: 18,75-25 
     Source: Author 
Table 4 shows exactly which fraud schemes express a higher level of fraud risk. It is easily 
understandable that “Illegal Gratuities” present the highest level fraud risk among the analyzed 
schemes, varying between 12,66 in the “Contract’s Management” and 14,06 in the “Negotiation” 
and “Evaluation and Selection of Suppliers” sub processes. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that none 
of the fraud schemes reaches the most severe level of risk. “Theft”, “Economic Extortion”, 
“Fraudulent Disbursements” and “Evasion” reveal a low fraud risk level. 
Analyzing sub processes’, “Evaluation and Selection of Suppliers” and “Negotiation”, respectively, 
appear as the most prone to fraudulent events, specially to “Bribery” and “Illegal “Gratuities”. 
When asked about the awareness and application of the existing procedures for “Selecção, 
Contratação e Manutenção de Fornecedores”, respondents expressed a positive image: 68,1% 
believes procedures are known by employees and 85% says they are applied correctly during the 

















































6,96 2,80 4,20 8,67 8,25 11,28 5,86
8,25 11,28 5,86 6,84
11,00 13,73 3,19 3,61
7,52
10,97 12,66 2,58 3,61 2,80 4,20 6,23
2,00 4,20 9,67 8,25 11,28 5,86
8,25 11,28 5,86 7,58
12,92 14,06 2,96 3,61
6,93
12,92 14,06 2,96 3,61 2,00 4,20 9,67
2,00 4,16 7,91 8,25 11,55 4,8911,71 13,52 2,10 3,60
Table 4 - Level of Fraud Risk perceived by collaborators 
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implementation of additional procedures and the need for a delineated training program to disclose 
the already existing procedures. 













                                       Source: Author 
The perceived controls’ effectiveness was evaluated, once again, through the average opinion of the 
questionnaire’s participants but, this time, a more objective factor was included to weigh their 
answers: the effective controls’ effectiveness according to findings/non-conformities found in 
controls during the last process audit (which were previously linked to each fraud scheme). As a 
result of these two factors’ average, internal controls unveiled different levels of effectiveness to 
specifically fight fraud schemes in the process (cf. Table5). The effectiveness ranged from 0%, in 
“Economic Extortion”
4
, to 79,80%, in “Theft”, “Evasion” and “Fraudulent Disbursement” schemes. 
Moreover, it is important to point the low effectiveness of controls linked to “False 
Documents/Transactions” and “Overstatement of Accounting Items”, which obtained only 19,33%. 
                                                          
4

























Liabilities’ increase (collusion) 
45,28% 
Equity value damage (Image) 
45,28% 
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Along with controls’ classification in terms of ability to fight fraud, a question regarding the 
sufficiency of current internal controls was raised and 66,7% answered “Yes”. 
The last factor taken into account was the existence continuous monitoring of certain items in the 
process, which in the case of “Selecção, Contratação e Manutenção de Fornecedores” is not 
applicable. Consequently, no alterations of the fraud risk level were made due to it (as the 
ponderation value was equal to one). 
The result of aggregating all the data compiled for each factor and using the formula (3) in section 
V determined a real risk level of fraud schemes that is summarized in Table 6.  




































NA 6,69 NA NA 6,66 6,19 4,55 
          Source: Author 
The values obtained vary between 0,47 (“Fraudulent Disbursements”) and 6,69 (“Overstatement of 
Financial items”) and indicate that, although certain fraud schemes presented considerable levels of 
fraud risk, after considering internal controls’ mitigation effect, the risk level is significantly 
reduced. This effect is evident in “Bribery”, “Illegal Gratuities” and “Conflicts of Interest”, for 
example, which were substituted by “False Documents/Transactions”, “Liabilities’ Increase 
(through price-collusion with suppliers)” as the most risky fraud schemes. A possible explanation 
for this situation is: since fraud schemes of the “Corruption” group are already well-known and 
catch the attention of top-managers, the designed procedures and internal controls tend to mitigate 
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these schemes more than the remaining ones. Additionally, it is noticeable that the real level of 
fraud risk is generally low, which may express results biased, to a certain extent, specially if any 
potential fraudsters were approached in the questionnaires. 
Table 7 – Real Level of Fraud Risk (per Sub process) 
Sub process 
Real Level of Fraud Risk 
per sub process 
Procurement 3,83 
Evaluation and Selection of Suppliers 4,61 
Negotiation 4,22 
Contracts’ Management 4,76 
Suppliers’ Management and Revision 4,24 
  Source: Author 
When evaluating the average fraud exposure (which includes all possible fraud schemes) per sub 
processes (Table 7), it reflects higher levels in “Contracts’ Management” and “Evaluation and 
Selection of Suppliers”. Generally, respondents referred that, even though there were principles, 
procedures and controls that established certain steps and the obligation to set criteria to choose 
suppliers and evaluate proposals, there was always an ad-hoc component throughout the process 
and in evaluations. Also, the characteristics of retail sector, which entails the research for a great 
number of suppliers for many products, complicated the proposals’ completely objective evaluation 
and the management of relationships with suppliers. Every time the process’s mechanisms are 
activated, a certain degree of customization to the kind of good being sourced or the suppliers’ 
characteristics is needed. 
General Questions and Notes 
As mentioned before, the final group of questions was focused on the company’s reporting channel 
and specific fraud-training received (besides the mandatory training about the company’s Code of 
Conduct). When asked if the respondents had ever experienced fraud-training while at Sonae, not 
only 9,1% answered “Yes”, but also most of the negative responses were followed by the 
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identification of the need to raise awareness and specific training about this fracturing theme. With 
respect to the fraud-reporting channel, opinions were less homogeneous: 38,1% confirmed a 
preference for the current system (that requires the identification of the whistleblower), relative to 
the 61,9% respondents selecting the anonymous reporting channel as the most fruitful one, despite 
the possibility of creating an atmosphere of distrust. 
Throughout interviews and e-mail questionnaires, collaborators used the opportunity to express 
their concerns and suggestions to improve the process flow. Some of the most remarkable 
commentaries emphasized the need to increase the training provided to new hires and current 
employees, the importance of a fraud assessment as a deterrence mechanism and the relevance of 
paying attention to transactions involving the responsibility of lower hierarchical employees. 
V. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The goal of this WP was the development and implementation of a methodology, which would 
allow the IA department of Sonae to assess fraud risk in the process of “Selecção, Contratação e 
Manutenção de Fornecedores”. This assessment revealed that “Corruption” group of fraud 
schemes, namely “Illegal Gratuities” and “Bribery”, is perceived as the one with the highest 
Likelihood of Occurrence and Impact. However, after considering the effectiveness of controls in 
the mitigation of fraud, the pattern changed: “False Documents/Transactions”, “Overstatement of 
Accounting Items” and “Liabilities’ Increase” present the highest levels of fraud risk. Concerning 
sub processes, “Evaluation and Selection of Suppliers” and “Contracts’ Management” are seen as 
the most prone to fraud events.  
In general, the discovered values of fraud risk do not express any critical or high level of such risk. 
This situation may derive from a limitation of the methodology: the real fraud risk estimation relies 
greatly on the sensitivity of collaborators, which may reveal a tendency to underestimate fraud risk, 
either to protect their own department, or due to lack of understanding of the phenomenon’s 
relevance. Nonetheless, a relative analysis of which fraud schemes and sub processes are more 
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problematic can still be performed and, once the method is applied to all the other processes of 
Sonae, this relative analysis will also permit their ranking, according to fraud risk levels obtained. 
Thus, the information gathered is still of great relevance and will certainly help top-managers draw 
conclusions about possible internal vulnerabilities, prior to the occurrence of problems.  
Still, this limitation reinforces the need to introduce specific fraud-training in the company’s 
training programs to guarantee awareness about the theme and the existing procedures. 
Additionally, the enforcement of the procedure that instructs collaborators to register all the 
information about possible suppliers prior to the contract signing, allied to an homogenization of 
evaluation reports among departments/divisions of the company and the improvement of internal 
document-sharing and communication channels, would certainly permit a reduction of the 
company’s exposure to fraud and facilitate the initiation of regular fraud assessments. Lastly, it is 
crucial to ensure the involvement of senior managers during the assessment and treatment of fraud 
risk, inasmuch as their attention to warning signs and direct contribution in the assessment are 
fundamental to effectively manage fraud risk. Their participation in the process will establish a 
strong tone at the top, which is known to have a significant effect in the deterrence of fraud 
(Hermanson, Smith & Stephens, 2012).   
Future work should be even more focused on preventing, rather than detecting, fraudulent activity. 
For that matter, applying this methodology to all the processes of Sonae, the future, is crucial and 
will provide a good perspective of the phenomenon’s relevance in the company. Moreover, fraud- 
specific audit tests to assess controls’ effectiveness are being developed, to complement the opinion 
of and reduce the exposure to employees’ subjectivity in such analysis. Also, to reduce the 
possibility of obtaining biased results, opinions of external experts should be included in the 
estimation of likelihood and impact. To complement this research, a formal fraud response plan, 
with a clearly defined response strategy (that can instill the company’s care about the topic on 
employees’ minds) will be created for the company.   
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